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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In her Revised Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hurles argued that the district court erred 
when it determined that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege. 
Ms. Hurles also argued that the district court's restitution award was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, and that it erred when it included civil attorney fees 
in the restitution award. This brief is necessary to reply to the State's assertion that 
Ms. Hurles abandoned her claim based on the accountant-client privilege. This brief is 
also necessary to reply to the State's assertion that the district court's restitution order 
was supported by substantial and competent evidence, as well as its assertion that civil 
attorneys' fees are awardable as restitution because there is a causal relationship 
between those fees and Ms. Hurles' criminal behavior. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hurles' Revised Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it concluded that the Morrisons did not implicitly 
waive the accountant-client privilege? 
2. Was the district court's restitution calculation supported by substantial and 
competent evidence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it included civil attorneys' fees as 




The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly 
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege 
Ms. Hurles did not abandon her claim of error related to the district court's 
conclusion that the Morrisons could invoke the accountant-client privilege. At the 
second restitution hearing, Ms. Hurles called the Morrisons' accountant, Mr. Warr, to 
testify and the Morrisons invoked the accountant-client privilege. (08/04/11 Tr., p.10, 
L.13 - p.12, L.12.) After hearing a brief argument, the district court ruled that the 
Morrisons' appropriately invoked the accountant-client privilege and excused Mr. Warr 
from the hearing. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.16, L.1.) The restitution hearing was 
continued, and at the final restitution/sentencing hearing, trial counsel proffered 
additional reasons why the court should revisit its prior ruling about the applicability of 
the accountant-client privilege. (08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.98, L.7.) The district court 
then stated that if trial counsel would like the court to revisit the privilege issue, trial 
counsel had thirty days to file a motion. (08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.9 - p.99, L.1.) The district 
court then imposed all of the restitution requested by the State. (08/11/11 Tr., p.103, 
Ls.9-12.) Trial counsel never filed a renewed motion challenging the trial court's 
accountant-client privilege ruling. 
Based on the foregoing facts, the State argues that Ms. Hurles abandoned her 
ability to challenge the district court's ruling on the privilege issue on appeal because 
Ms. Hurles never filed a motion to revisit the district court's prior ruling. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.5-9.) In support of this position, the State cites State v. Barnes 
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133 Idaho 378 (1999). In that case, the defendant filed a suppression motion but never 
followed up on it, and it was never ruled on by the district court. Id. at 384. The Idaho 
Supreme Court refused to address the suppression issue on appeal because an 
appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless the record 
discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error."' Id. 
(quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485 (1993)). However, this case is inapposite, 
as there were multiple rulings on the privilege issue. The first ruling occurred at the 
second restitution hearing, where the accountant-client privilege was invoked, the 
district court found a privilege existed, and the district court excused Mr. Warr from 
testifying. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.16, L.1.) The second ruling on the issue occurred 
when the district court imposed the full amount of restitution at the sentencing hearing. 
(08/11/11 Tr., p.103, Ls.9-12; R., pp.71-72.) While the State argues that Ms. Hurles 
abandoned her claim, that is not an accurate as the district court ruled on the privilege 
issue and imposed all of the restitution requested by the State. The district court's 
decision to allow the defense to file a motion was, in substance, an invitation for 
Ms. Hurles to file a motion for reconsideration of the district court's prior ruling on the 
accountant-client privilege issue. 
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11. 
The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial And 
Competent Evidence 
The main issue identified by Ms. Hurles in support of her argument that the 
restitution award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence is that the 
State's restitution calculation failed to consider the fact that Ms. Hurles only took ten to 
twenty percent of the cashed checks and placed the remaining proceeds into the ATM. 
(Revised Appellant's Brief, p.26.) In response, the State argues that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it disregarded Ms. Hurles' "non-credible" version of 
events. (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.) Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, 
the State never contested below the fact that Ms. Hurles only took ten to twenty percent 
of the checks she cashed. In fact, Jody Morrison conceded that Ms. Hurles only took a 
percentage of the checks she cashed. The following dialogue occurred at the first 
restitution hearing: 
Q [defense counsel]: So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that Ms. Hurles 
wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a significant 
portion back to the bar. 
A [Ms. Morrison): I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that she 
would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that 
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear. 
(05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) Ms. Hurles provided the following explanation of her 
actions in the PSI: 
Ms. Hurles admitted that she had taken money from the ATM. She 
supported that she did this by cashing petty cash checks that were 
supposed to be used to fill the ATM. She said she would put some of the 
money in the ATM but keep some for herself. Ms. Hurles used the 
example of (verbatim), "If I cashed a check for $500, ·1 would put $400 or 
so into the ATM and then pocket the rest." 
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(PSI, p.7.) As mentioned in the Revised Appellant's Brief, Ms. Berriochoa1 testified that 
the $153,920.00 amount was based on the total amount of the checks, but that total did 
not take into account the fact that Ms. Hurles deposited_ between eighty to ninety 
percent of the checks' proceeds into the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-18.) As such, 
the district court's ultimate restitution award of $155,440.002 is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, as Mr. Morrison agreed that Ms. Hurles did not 
take the full amount of the checks she cashed and the ultimate restitution award did not 
take that uncontested fact into consideration. 
To the extent that the State argues on appeal that Ms. Hurles took the total 
amount of the cashed checks, it is important to note that there is no evidence in the 
record indicating as such. In fact, the only evidence in the record are Ms. Hurles' 
statements in the PSI (PSI, p.7.) and the testimony of Ms. Morrison where she agreed 
with defense counsel that Ms. Hurles returned a significant portion of the proceeds of 
the cashed checks back to the No Lawyers Bar. (05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) 
Ms. Hurles also argued in her Revised Appellant's Brief that the restitution order 
should not include losses between 2005 and November of 2008, because Ms. Hurles 
only pleaded guilty to events which occurred between December 2008 and December 
of 2009, and the events which occurred prior to December of 2008 are not causally 
related to the criminal acts for which she was convicted. (Revised Appellant's Brief, 
pp.26-29.) The State responds by arguing that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay for losses that 
1 Ms. Berriochoa is the paralegal from Givens Pursley that created the spreadsheet 
utilized by the State for its restitution calculation. 
2 The district court also awarded as part of the restitution an additional amount of 
$48,734.61 for civil attorney fees. 
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the Morrisons allegedly incurred between 2005 and November of 2008. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.23-25.) In support of this position, the State relies on the transcript of the 
change of plea hearing where the State said that it "is going to seek restitution of all 
DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Ms. Hurles still 
stands behind her argument in the Revised Appellant's Brief. However, assuming that 
the State's contention has merit, the term relied on by the State is far too ambiguous to 
draw the conclusion that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for the losses which 
allegedly occurred between 2005 and November of 2008. 
"Idaho Code § 19-5304(9) permits the court, 'with the consent of the parties,' to 
enter an order for restitution to the victim or others 'for economic loss or injury for crimes 
which are not adjudicated or are not before the court."' State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 
373 (Ct. App. 2007). There are various reasons why the State's assertion that 
Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for uncharged conduct is problematic. First, the 
State said it wanted to "seek" restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery." 
(02/17/11 Tr., p.1,Ls.21-22.) The mere fact that the State is going to seek restitution for 
certain amounts does not mean that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for 
those amounts. See State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495-498 (Ct. App. 2012). 
More importantly, the foregoing "terms" of the plea agreement are far too 
ambiguous to be enforceable against Ms. Hurles. "[W]here the language of [a] plea 
agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the defendant." 
State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2013). "In determining whether a contract 
is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations." Id. 
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The term "DRs" is ambiguous because it is not defined anywhere in the record. It 
could be a reference to the dismissed charge. This would be consistent with the 
State's comment at the end of the change of plea hearing where the State said that the 
restitution amount "will include the dismissed charge as well." (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-
17.) It could be a reference to restitution for an unrelated case. This would be 
consistent with the guilty plea advisory form where Ms. Hurles indicated that she had 
agreed to pay restitution in another case. (R., p.40.) One could speculate as to various 
meaning of "DRs," as that term is not defined in the record and the State never 
attempted to define that term at the change of plea hearing. Since there are a 
multitude of meanings for the phrase "DRs" there is an ambiguity which should be 
resolved in Ms. Hurles favor. As such, Ms. Hurles argues that the phrase "DRs" is a 
reference to the dismissed charge, the restitution for which she did not challenge below 
and she is not challenging on appeal. 
Additionally, the State's use of the word seek restitution for the all the DRs 
creates another ambiguity. As mentioned above, the word seek could mean that the 
State will attempt to request restitution. However, that term does not necessarily mean 
that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for everything the State was seeking. 
See Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-498 (holding that the phrase "Restitution is not to 
exceed $1,156.98" meant that the State's restitution request was capped at $1,156.98). 
Due to this ambiguity, Ms. Hurles argues that the word seek should be construed in 
Ms. Hurles' favor and merely functions as a cap on the amount of restitution the State 
can request. 
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In sum, the State's characterization of Ms. Hurles' version of events as being 
"non-credible" is not supported by the record, as the State's witness agreed that 
Ms. Hurles only took a portion of the proceeds from the cashed checks. Additionally, 
Ms. Hurles only pleaded guilty to taking money between December of 2008 to 
December 2009 and the restitution award for alleged losses which falls outside of the 
foregoing dates is not causally related to Ms. Hurles' criminal behavior. Alternatively, 
and in the event this Court concludes that Ms. Hurles might have agreed to pay for 
those losses, the ambiguity of the terms "DRs" and "seeks" should be construed in 
Ms. Hurles' favor. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorney Fees As Part Of 
The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceeding 
In her Revised Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hurles argued that the district court erred 
when it awarded civil attorney fees, over her objection, because they have been defined 
as non-economic damages by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 
165 (Ct. App. 2006). In response, the State cites State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 
(2011 ), for the proposition that the Court of Appeals' holding in Parker was implicitly 
overruled and that the State need only to establish causation in order for restitution to 
be awardable pursuant I.C. § 19-5304. (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-32.) The State's 
reliance on Corbus is misplaced, as that case merely dealt with causation in the context 
of economic loss and Parker was dealing with the definition of what constitutes non-
economic loss. These two cases deal with entirely separate issues. 
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Idaho Code Section 19-5304 allows a court to award damages for economic 
losses, but expressly precludes a restitution award for non-economic losses. 
Specifically, I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) defines economic loss as including, but not being 
limited to, "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost 
wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses 
resulting from the criminal conduct .... " I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). Idaho Code Section 19-
5304(1 )(a) goes on to expressly exclude restitution awards based on "less tangible 
damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress." I.C. § 19-
5304(1 )(a). In Parker, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether attorney 
fees constituted economic loss under I.C. § 19-5304. Parker, 143 Idaho at 167-168. 
The Court of Appeals first noted that one of the main purposes behind the restitution 
statute was to "obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a 
separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses." Id. at 167. The 
Court of Appeals then concluded that the "prevention of future harm" does not constitute 
economic loss. Id. at 168. 
In Corbus, the question before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the injuries 
a passenger sustained after jumping out of a moving vehicle were proximately caused 
by the driver's crime of reckless driving. In that case, police observed Corbus driving a 
vehicle approximately sixty five miles an hour in a thirty five mile an hour zone. Corbus, 
150 Idaho at 601. A high speed chase ensued and the passenger jumped out of 
Corbus' vehicle while the car was going approximately fifty miles per hour. Id. The 
district court awarded restitution to the passenger for the injuries which resulted from 
jumping out of Corbus' car. Id. Corbus appealed and the issue on appeal was whether 
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the restitution was awardable under the restitution statute or, in other words, whether 
there was a causal connection between Corbus' criminal activity and the passenger's 
injuries. Id. at 601-602. The Idaho Supreme Court then employed a detailed analysis 
of causation dealing with both actual cause and proximate cause. However, the Corbus 
Opinion never dealt with the issue of whether the restitution at issue was economic or 
non-economic loss. As such, the State's implicit assertion that Corbus overruled Parker 
is without merit because those cases were dealing with separate issues. 
If the State's position is taken to its logical end, it would allow for the restitution 
awards for non-economic damages which are expressly precluded in I.C. § 19-5304. 
As mentioned above, the State argues, based on Corbus, that the only applicable 
question when determining whether restitution is awardable pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 
is if causation exists. This argument is misplaced, because the question of whether the 
damages are economic or non-economic must first be answered. See I.C. § 19-5304. 
It is only after it has been determined that the damages at issue are economic losses 
that the causation issue addressed in Corbus becomes relevant because if it is 
determined that the damages at issue are non-economic they are not awardable and 
the issue of causation becomes irrelevant. The State invites this Court to ignore the 
question of whether the damages at issue are economic or non-economic and only 
focus on the question of causation. If the State's position is taken to its logical extreme 
then a victim could file a civil action to recover non-economic wrongful death damages 
and the district court, in the criminal case, could award attorney fees incurred in the civil 




Ms. Hurles respectfully requests that this case be remanded for another 
restitution hearing with instructions that the district court allow Mr. Warr to testify and 
that restitution only be ordered for the thefts which occurred from December 2008 to 
December of 2009. Ms. Hurles also requests an instruction consistent with this Court's 
rulings on the issues relating to the civil attorneys' fees. In the event this Court 
determines that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege, or any other 
claim of error is deemed meritless, Ms. Hurles alternatively requests that this case be 
remanded for new restitution hearing with applicable instructions as to any of 
Ms. Hurles' prevailing claims of error. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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